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I . A PL A1 T1 D ROAD NEED NOT BE PHYSICALLY BUILT FOR A 
LAN IX ) \ \ NER TO ENJOY A PRIVATE RIGHT OF WAY OVER 
IT. 
The County disputes Mr. Evans argument that since Pine Street was 
platted, though not physically constructed, his predecessor in interest could 
reserve a right of way over it and pass il on to M i P\ an • i Brief of* Appellee 
[hereinafter "BOA"] at 6.) The Count} asserts Mr, Iwans too narrowly construes 
r-»-' -,.. . i 
Mr. Evans' position and construction of that case was already stated in his 
Appellant* s Brief (j Vplt, Br. at 8 10). I lowever, an additional consideration ior 
the Court is the polio and practical problems that the Count vV rcadir.: - -
Carrier ^^.ix cau.^ m named subdivisions in which lots are sold hut not all 
roads have been bum oi nnr . • • • ' . . 
Suppose a subdivision developer did not install street improvements throughout 
the subdivision 1: \ it is alio w eci I u idei a pla t oi de ( ' elopn leiit agi eement to do so in 
the future. For example, the developer may have bonded to construct 
rem.;: . - , . - ....:-, ,-o '•••\ ':*... a -.jria in percentage of lots UR; S-,J or . 
built upon. 
A homeowner then builds on a lot in the subdivision with the expectation 
he or she will have a right of access over aii ' *! •" *^ • • 
1
 The County correctly notes that the parties stipulated that Mrs. Terry Evans could be joined in this action 
as a co-owner of Mr. Evans' property. That formal action has not occurred because the suit was dismissed 
on summary judgment. However, Mr. and Mrs. Evans stipulate that the decision in this appeal will apply 
with equal force to each of them. 
developer and highway department agree the homeowner can have a temporary 
highway access directly from his or her lot until the streets are all in. The 
homeowner could also be looking forward to a more direct route via platted, 
dedicated streets to be built in the future to a freeway entrance, schools or 
shopping. 
However, the local government then decides to vacate some subdivision 
streets due to some governmental need and cuts off access to the street abutting 
the homeowner's lot or to other streets on which the homeowner, the 
homeowner's association or the developer was counting for efficient, or any, 
traffic circulation. Since under the County's interpretation of Carrier no one has 
a private right of access over streets that are platted and dedicated until they are 
actually graded, paved as necessary and in use, the whole expectation of traffic 
circulation would be upset. 
Further, a lot owner not only would lack guaranteed access until 
construction was complete on a street and vehicles were using it, but also could 
not get title insurance and sell the lot because a buyer could obtain current, legal 
access over merely platted streets and would have no guarantee of future access. 
There would be no remedy for lost access tlirough a government vacation of the 
street because there would be no private right to enforce or compensate. 
Finally, if there is no private right of access over platted streets, why is 
there a statute providing for their vacation—the very statute the County relied 
upon in vacating the other platted streets in the subdivision. (See Culbertson v. 
2 
Hermes Assoc. Ltd, 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642, 654 (citing Utah Code Ann. Sec 
72-5-105.) 
II. THE RESERVATION DID NOT VIOLATE THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS BECAUSE THE EASEMENT DIMENSIONS ARE 
SPECIFIED AND LOCATABLE. 
The County acknowledges the reserved easement is described by width 
and purpose but is unenforceable because its precise location is not fixed. Again, 
Mr. Evans stated in his Appellant's Brief why the trial court could fix the location 
of the easement and the various factors that would define the most reasonable 
location. (Aplt. Brf. At 4-8). 
Contrary to the County's argument that the easement was vague because it 
could traverse the length as well as the width of the County's property (BOA at 
10), the reservation states the easement is defined as only 56 feet wide, and 
extends only from Mr. Evans' property to Pine Street. So its width and length are 
fixed. Mr. Evans did not seek "scores of crossing points" through the County's 
parcel (BOA at 10) but rather asserted only a 56 foot wide rectangle extending 
from his property to Pine Street in a single location the trial court could fix with a 
factual inquiry. The easement is thus not vague, is readily locatable and is much 
less intrusive than the natural resource exploitation floating or roving easements 
identified as enforceable in the County's brief (BOA at 12-13). Accordingly, the 
Court could prevent a forfeiture of a right by remanding this matter for the trial 
3 
court to determine a reasonable location for the easement which would fulfill its 
purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and for those stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, Mr. 
Evans requests that this Court reverse the Order Granting Summary Judgment and 
remand the case for trial or further proceedings in the trial court. 
Dated this 20th Day of August, 2003. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
( Samuel D. McVey 
Attorney for Appellant-Plaintiff 
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